United Nations A/63/121

General Assembly

Distr.: General
14 July 2008

Original: English

Sixty-third session
Item 79 of the preliminary list*
Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Twenty-one States submitted reports, pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 61/31, by the established deadline (see section II of the report);

Three views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 61/31 (see section III of the report);

Nineteen additional States became participants to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives and one State notified its withdrawal from one of the instruments (see section IV of the report), since the previous report (A/61/119) on the topic.

* A/63/50.

08-42145 (E) 010808

I. Introduction

1. On 4 December 2006, the General Assembly adopted resolution 61/31, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives". Paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of the resolution read as follows:

> *The General Assembly*,
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> ...
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> 10. *Requests*:
>
> (a) All States to report to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;
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> (b) The State in which the violation took place — and, to the extent possible, the State where the alleged offender is present — to report to the Secretary-General as promptly as possible on measures taken to bring the offender to justice and eventually to communicate, in accordance with its laws, the final outcome of the proceedings against the offender, and to report on measures adopted with a view to preventing a repetition of such violations;
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> (c) The States so reporting to consider using or taking into account the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General;
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> ...
>
> 12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to invite States, in the circular note referred to in paragraph 11 (a) above, to inform him of their views with respect to any measures needed or already taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;
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> 13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a report containing:
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> (a) Information on the state of ratification of, and accessions to, the instruments referred to in paragraph 8 above;
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> (b) A summary of the reports received and views expressed pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above.

2. By notes dated 15 December 2006 and 29 February 2008, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraph 10 (a) of resolution 61/31 and invited them to report to the Secretary-General serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

3. The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 61/31.

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports relevant to paragraph 10 of the resolution.[1]

5. Section III of the report contains the views expressed pursuant to paragraph 12 of the resolution.

6. Section IV of the report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 20 June 2007, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,[2] the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,[3] and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.[4]

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 61/31

7. The **Libyan Arab Jamahiriya** (25 September 2006) referred to the communication from Italy (7 June 2006) concerning the incidents involving the premises of the Consulate General of Italy in Bengasi (17-18 February 2006):

> the competent authorities in Libya have advised that the issues in question are still being considered by the courts in Libya, and shall advise of measures taking in this regard in the near future.

8. The **Republic of Korea** (11 October 2006) reported an incident, involving the residence of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in Seoul (16 July 2004):

> On 16 July 2004, an individual broke into the residence of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in Seoul. The individual was captured by the police and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for the crime of housebreaking by the Seoul Western District Court.

9. **Cyprus** (25 October 2006) referred to the communication from the Holy See (10 April 2006) concerning the incidents involving the Nunciature in Nicosia (5 December 2003 and 19 January 2005):[5]

> The competent public order authorities in Cyprus registered on 5 December 2003 a complaint by the Chargé d'affaires of the Holy See in Cyprus concerning an incident that had taken place the day before, during which he himself had been attacked in an attempted robbery. Cyprus police have recorded testimony of the crime, have carried out the necessary crime scene investigation and have isolated evidence that provides solid grounds for prosecution.
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> However, the investigation is ongoing and the case has not progressed because it has been verified by Cyprus police that the perpetrators entered the Nunciature from the area of Cyprus which is occupied by Turkish troops and

[1] For the documents circulated under the agenda item at the request of Argentina, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Qatar, see A/61/599, A/61/955-S/2007/355 and A/61/1047.

[2] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310.

[3] Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638.

[4] Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410.

[5] See A/61/119, para. 11.

where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control. Cyprus police are therefore unable to extend their investigation to the entire territory of Cyprus, which would in this case be required for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.

It should also be noted that the premises of the representation of the Holy See in Cyprus are situated inside the buffer zone, which separates the area controlled by the Cyprus Government and the area occupied by Turkish troops, and which is an area that only the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) currently uses to effectively carry out its mandate. Owing to the narrow width of the buffer zone where the Nunciature is located, its northern face is in the area under the control of the Turkish occupation army. Its main, southern, entrance is situated in the Government-controlled area and is included in regular patrols of the Cyprus police.

Despite the limitations placed on Cypriot authorities by circumstances outside their control, Cyprus is firmly committed to its obligations for diplomatic protection under international law and will pursue this investigation until the perpetrators have been brought to justice. In the meantime, the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken, at its own expense, to enhance the security of the Nunciature and deter future incidents by constructing a number of security features in its premises, at a cost of $39,500.

As far as the incident referred to in the note dated 10 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations as having occurred on 19 January 2005, Cypriot authorities have no complaint registered by the representative of the Holy See in Cyprus to have taken place on that day.

10. **Pakistan** (30 October 2006) reported an incident, involving the residence of the High Commissioner of Pakistan to Sri Lanka in Colombo (14 August 2006):

the convoy of His Excellency Mr. Bashir Wali Mohammad, High Commissioner of Pakistan to Sri Lanka, was attacked on 14 August 2006 in Colombo.

The High Commissioner, along with his family, was on his way to attend a farewell lunch at a local hotel in Colombo. When his car reached Liberty Plaza, Colombo, a powerful remote control bomb placed in a three-wheeler parked nearby exploded. The High Commissioner's life along with his family was saved. However, there were casualties, which included seven dead and nine injured, all Sri Lankan nationals. The dead included four Sri Lankan security guards provided by the Government of Sri Lanka for the protection of the High Commissioner and three passers-by. The nine injured included three security guards and six passers-by.

11. **Cyprus** (29 November 2006) referred to a report submitted by the Russian Federation (19 July 2006) regarding incidents involving the Russian Embassy:[6]

the competent authorities in Cyprus have not ... received any official complaint to report telephone threats directed towards the Embassy of the

[6] For the relevant part of the report by the Russian Federation, see A/61/119/Add.2, para. 2.

Russian Federation. ... As such, an appropriate investigation pertaining to such threats could not be carried out.

12. **Spain** (7 December 2006) referred to the communication from Italy (7 June 2006) concerning the incident involving the Italian Cultural Institute in Barcelona (12 July 2005):[7]

> appropriate measures were initiated immediately after the attack and continue to be taken, within the existing legal framework, in respect of extremist groups believed to be capable of committing the kinds of criminal acts alleged in the official report on this incident.
>
> These measures include maintaining regular contact with the competent authorities of Italy and Greece, as there is circumstantial evidence that individuals suspected of having been involved in the attack have ties with groups in those countries.

13. **Romania** (26 March 2007) referred to a report submitted by the Russian Federation (19 July 2006) regarding incidents involving the Russian Embassy in Romania:[6]

> The Government of Romania took note of the note verbale dated 19 July 2006 submitted by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, containing reference to alleged periodic telephone threats to commit terrorist attacks received by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bucharest.
>
> Such alleged threats have nevertheless never been reported to the Romanian competent authorities by the Russian Embassy in Bucharest.

14. **Turkey** (27 March 2007) referred to a report submitted by the Russian Federation (19 July 2006) regarding incidents involving the Russian Embassy in Turkey:[6]

> The report, annexed to the ... note of the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations dated 19 July 2006, contains information on violations of the security of diplomatic agents of the Russian Federation in 2006 and states, inter alia, that at the Russian Embassy in Turkey periodic telephone threats to commit terrorist acts have been reported.
>
> The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations would like to underline that from January 2005 until September 2006, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Turkey has not received any request from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ankara regarding such telephone threats.

15. **Estonia** (15 May 2007) referred to incidents involving violations of the protection, security and safety of the Estonian foreign missions in the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus (27 April to 10 May 2007):

> **Russian Federation, Embassy of the Republic of Estonia in Moscow**
>
> • From 27 April to 3 May, constant demonstrations took place around the Embassy and residential premises, loud noise and music

[7] See A/61/119/Add.1, para. 6.

disturbing the peace and Embassy's work; contrary to the usual practice the local authorities did not inform the Embassy of the planned demonstrations beforehand

- During this time, access to the Embassy was not controlled by the militia (term used for the police authorities of the Russian Federation) present but by the demonstrators. On 27 April, the Estonian Ambassador was forced to re-enter the Embassy after an abortive attempt to leave the building. On 29 April the members of the Russian youth movements obstructed the entry to the Embassy of an Estonian journalist and a member of the Embassy's consular staff. On 30 April they prevented the Russian television channel Ren-TV from entering the Embassy for an interview with the Ambassador. The militia having been present during those incidents did not provide any help
- The fence and walls of the Embassy were vandalized; on the night of 29/30 April the wall of the consular section in Moscow was defaced with swearwords and swastikas
- On 1 May, one of the demonstrators intruded on the territory of the Embassy, took down the Estonian flag and cut it to pieces
- On 2 May, there was a physical attack against the Ambassador of Estonia at a press conference convened at the premises of the *Arguments and Facts* newspaper that was warded off only by the staff of the Embassy and press centre; again, the security forces responsible for the protection of the diplomatic missions claimed they were unable to help
- Stones and other objects were repeatedly thrown at the Embassy; on the night of 2/3 May several windows of the Embassy building were broken by stones or shots from a weapon
- Activists in Moscow are soliciting signatures to demand demolishing the Estonian Embassy and declaring the ambassador a fugitive.

Russian Federation, Consulate General of the Republic of Estonia in St. Petersburg

- On 28 April 2007 the building of the consulate was pelted with eggs.

Russian Federation, Chancery of St. Petersburg's Consulate General of the Republic of Estonia in Pskov

- On 27 April, several offending items and slogans were placed in front of the office building. The items were removed by the militia.
- On 30 April, the office building was defaced with swastikas and other symbols. According to the militia the offenders have been arrested.
- On 5 May, the Estonian flag was stolen from the wall of the office building. Despite the fact that the militia, guarding the office building around-the-clock was located approximately 10 metres from the flag, the incident remained unnoticed.

- On 10 May, the office building was shot at from a firearm; the window of the office of the Consul and some furniture inside the office were broken.

Owing to the obstruction the work of the consular department of the Embassy in Moscow was suspended until 4 May; also, the Chancery in Pskov was temporarily closed. In view of the clear danger to the lives of the diplomats and their families, the Estonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs was forced to enhance the security measures of the Missions concerned, to evacuate the families of the Embassy staff in Moscow and seriously consider the evacuation of all diplomats.

The Russian militia, which the Embassy has several times asked for help and protection, was operating sporadically; although on most occasions the militia made some effort to enable the Estonian Missions to perform their functions, for example, by moving aside protestors in Moscow to permit the official vehicle of the Ambassador to depart and arrive; and arresting the offenders, that was not always the case, as indicated above.

The Republic of Estonia strongly protested the breaches of the inviolability of Estonian foreign missions. The Embassy and the consulates repeatedly requested the Russian authorities to provide the necessary protection of their premises and personnel in accordance with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. On 2 May 2007 the Foreign Minister of Estonia was in contact with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Lavrov, who gave assurances that the situation would be improved immediately. Despite that, the violations in Moscow were brought to an end by the Russian authorities only after the Estonian Ambassador left Russia on 3 May 2007 for vacation. Since then several peaceful demonstrations have taken place on streets around the Embassy. The situation in Pskov, however, worsened after 4 May.

Republic of Belarus, Estonian Consulate in Minsk

From 3-7 May 2007, several aggressive demonstrations took place in front of the consulate. The consulate was not informed of the demonstrations beforehand. The local Foreign Ministry and the police have been notified of the events.

16. **Belgium** (31 May 2007) referred to a report submitted by the Russian Federation (19 July 2006) regarding the incidents involving the Russian overseas agency in Belgium:[6]

> with the exception of the incident mentioned by the Russian Federation ... no serious violation of the duty to protect missions and diplomatic and consular representations has been reported. The violation to which the Russian Federation referred in its note had to do with an attempt on 17 November 2006 to break into an apartment rented by the Mission of the Russian Federation. The attempted break-in caused damage to the apartment door.

17. **Mexico** (5 June 2007) reported an incident involving the premises of the Embassy of Canada in Mexico (31 March 2007):

> On 31 March 2007, at approximately 4 a.m., a man about 25 years of age emerged from a vehicle and threw an improvised explosive device into the main entrance of the Embassy of Canada in Mexico. He then fled in the same vehicle.
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> The low-powered explosive hit the building immediately above the main door and burst into flames, filling the entrance and adjacent area with smoke. The device burned out without causing any damage to the premises.
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> The Embassy official responsible for security stated that he had the emergency telephone numbers of the Second Citizens' Protection Unit "Embassy Service", which had been set up specifically to protect foreign, intergovernmental and diplomatic missions and representatives. However, given the nature and outcome of the incident, he had not considered it necessary to contact the Service.
>
> As a result, the Second Citizens' Protection Unit did not learn of the incident until approximately 5 a.m., when it conducted its routine patrol of the area. The officers organized a search for the perpetrator but were only able to obtain a statement from a witness to the incident.
>
> The Unit also immediately requested the assistance of the fire brigade and the Task Force Group (Special Forces), which searched the area for improvised explosive devices. Several hours later, the Embassy reported the incident to the relevant city authorities, who launched an investigation. To date, the persons responsible have not been arrested.

18. **Peru** (11 June 2007) referred to a report submitted by the Russian Federation (19 July 2006) regarding incidents involving the Russian overseas agency in Peru:[6]

> the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Peru has received no communication from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Peru informing it of the armed robbery of officials of its Embassy, nor of intimidating telephone calls.

19. **Sri Lanka** (20 June 2007) referred to a report submitted by Pakistan (30 October 2006) regarding an incident involving the High Commissioner of Pakistan to Sri Lanka in Colombo (14 August 2006) (see para. 10 above):

> Attack on the Convoy of Pakistan High Commissioner in Sri Lanka on 14 August 2006
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> On 14 August 2006 at about 13:10 hours the Pakistan High Commissioner, His Excellency Bazeer Vali Mohammed, was on his way to Hotel Galadari for a luncheon invitation with his wife and daughter in the back seat of vehicle No. 98-9217, which was driven by one Rumi and Sgt. Ajith of the Army Commando Unit occupying the front seat. The car was escorted from behind by five army commandos, including the driver in a Land Rover Jeep bearing No. WP KE 7607. The two vehicles were travelling along Ananda Coomaraswamy Mawatha towards Galle Road and at a point located about 50 metres away from Liberty Roundabout towards Green Path, there was an explosion and the back-up vehicle took the full brunt. The High Commissioner and his family members escaped unhurt. Eight persons including four army

commandos in the jeep died and scores received injuries. In addition, 17 vehicles which were using the said road at that time and some parked along the road were either burned and/or damaged.

Investigations revealed that the explosion had originated from a claymore mine fitted to a three-wheeler parked on a private road with its back facing Ananda Coomaraswamy Mawatha. A thorough search at the scene of the crime and scientific comparisons established WPJX 9328 as the registration number of the ill-fated three-wheeler. A record check with the office of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles revealed the owner of the three-wheeler as one Ube Halilu Rahuman of C/2/3, Temple Road, Colombo 10. On being questioned Halilu Rahuman stated that on 20 May 2006 he sold the three-wheeler to one Balasundaram Manoharan for Rs. 244,000 and Balasundaram was introduced to him by his cousin Mohammed Cader and a broker whom he came to know later as Sundaraj Kumaravel.

Sundaraj Kumaravel, on being questioned, stated that Manoharan is from Kilinochchi and is used to visiting Colombo very often to buy motorcycle and three-wheeler spare parts and that he was known to him for the previous three years. At the request of Manoharan, he had looked for the purchase of a three-wheeler and through Cader, he finally came in contact with Rahuman and arranged the transaction. He was given Rs. 2,000 by Manoharan for this deal. He further stated that Manoharan used to work in garages owned by LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] in Kilinochchi and he had seen him wearing the LTTE works unit uniform. He denies any involvement or knowledge of the explosion.

Inquiries revealed that this particular three-wheeler is generally parked at the parking lot near Sugathadasa Stadium. The records of the parking attendant confirmed that this three-wheeler entered the parking lot at 21:30 hours on 20 May 2006 and had left at 10:38 hours on 23 May 2006. However, the attendant does not maintain any record of the drivers of the vehicles.

In this connection, a suspect named Sundaraj Kumaravel, who acted as the broker to purchase the three-wheeler, was arrested and is currently under Detention Order. The facts of this case have been reported in Magistrates Court Fort Case No. 10300/2006 and the case was to be called on 16 May 2007.

The cellular phone of Sundaraj Kumaravel was checked and revealed that suspect Manoharan had contacted Kumaravel through mobile phone No. 0779-917226. Subsequent inquiries revealed that this phone is registered in the name of P. Sarojani of Sinnakinniya, Kinniya. This address was checked and it was learned that the inhabitants had moved to Trincomalee, vacating this house, and their current address is not known to the neighbourhood. Inquiries are in progress to locate P. Sarojani, with the assistance of Grama Seva Niladaris of Kinniya and Trincomalee. It also revealed that the above mobile telephone was not used after 8 July 2006.

According to the transfer papers of the three-wheeler, the address of the suspect Manoharan is given as Unguchchi Place, Colombo 11. Inquiries conducted in this regard revealed that he had furnished a fictitious address.

The Government analyst is of the opinion that the explosion was triggered by a remote-control device.

Owing to the escalation of LTTE violence in the country, especially in the city of Colombo, a new division named Diplomatic Security Division was established to enhance the security for the Foreign Missions and diplomats in Sri Lanka. In addition, a one-way traffic system and no parking of vehicles on the road sides have been introduced to prevent any recurrence of such attacks.

Further inquiries are being continued to trace Manoharan and to ascertain the details of the attack.

20. **Belarus** (6 September 2007) referred to a report submitted by Estonia (15 May 2007) referring to the incidents, involving the Estonian Consulate in Minsk, Republic of Belarus (3-7 May 2007) (see para. 14 above):

Several incidents of picketing took place in front of the Consulate of the Republic of Estonia in Minsk from 3-7 May 2007. To provide the Consulate of the Republic of Estonia proper secure conditions for its operation, the following measures (in addition to the standard) were taken:

1. The adjoining territory was periodically inspected by militia patrols on a 24-hour basis;

2. All the time pickets were held, an additional militia patrol was present near the Consulate;

3. For prompt response to possible complications of the situation, a temporary militia reserve unit was established and put on alert.

No violations of public order were either recorded by the competent authorities in the location of the Consulate or reported by the Consulate of the Republic of Estonia. The Government of the Republic of Belarus will continue to take appropriate comprehensive measures to provide protection, security and safety of all diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in the country.

21. The **Holy See** (13 May 2008) reported incidents involving the Apostolic Nunciature (3 January 2008) and the Pontifical Representation (14 February 2008) in Caracas, as well as the Pontifical Representation in Burundi (22 April 2008):

1. On 3 January 2008, in Caracas, **Venezuela**, a grenade launched from the road was found unexploded before the entrance of the Apostolic Nunciature. The device was later removed to the care of the security division of the national police.

On 14 February 2008, at 4:10 a.m., a bomb exploded in front of the metal gate along the surrounding wall of the Pontifical Representation, causing damage to the gate and shattering some windows on the front of the building.

Despite notes of protest, the Ministry of External Affairs did not show any reaction. Only after the explosion of 14 February, the Director General of Protocol contacted the Apostolic Nuncio to inform him that the Minister of the Interior and Justice was asked to begin an investigation into the facts. With a communication of 5 March 2008, the Ambassador of Venezuela to the Holy See affirmed that the investigation ascertained that the organizers of the bomb

attack of 14 February have no relation with the Government and with President H. Chavez.

2. On 22 April 2008, during the clash among government troops of **Burundi** and rebels of the National Liberation Force, a mortar shell hit the building of the Pontifical Representation, fortunately only causing material damage.

22. **Sweden** (14 May 2008) reported incidents involving the Honorary Consulate-General of Denmark in Kristianstad, Sweden (15-16 March 2007), the residence of the Ambassador of Estonia (2 May 2007), the Ethiopian Embassy (12 June 2007), the premises of the Iraqi Embassy (during 2006 and 2007), the Norwegian Embassy (5 September 2006), a member of the Syrian Arab Republic mission and other Embassies, consular missions and representatives:

During the last two years, the following incidents involving the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives have occurred in Sweden:

Denmark

On the night of 15-16 March 2007, unknown perpetrators smashed the window-panes of the front doors to the Honorary Consulate-General of Denmark in Kristianstad and sprayed paint on the facade. The graffiti presumably referred to the (then) ongoing closure of the Youth House in Copenhagen and the youth riots that followed in Copenhagen at the time.

Estonia

On 2 May 2007, an unknown perpetrator entered the locked staircase where the residence of the Ambassador is situated and graffitied insults on his door. This incident coincided with the protests in Tallinn and Moscow against the Estonian authorities' removal of a Second World War statue from a square in Tallinn.

Ethiopia

An unauthorized demonstration was held outside the Ethiopian Embassy on 12 June 2007 by 15 people who shouted at and insulted embassy staff on their way to work. The demonstrators attempted to attack the Ambassador's car, but the police stepped in to prevent this.

Iraq

Some incidents of disturbance of public order occurred on the premises of the Iraqi Embassy on various occasions during 2006 and 2007. All of these incidents were connected to disagreements between visitors and Embassy staff regarding applications for passports and visas at the Embassy.

Norway

On 5 September 2006, an upset man repeatedly threatened to burn down the Norwegian Embassy after having visited it. He was turned away from the Embassy and arrested. A custody dispute between him and a Norwegian citizen had preceded this threat.

Syrian Arab Republic

A member of the Syrian Arab Republic mission was the victim of burglary in his home on three different occasions and at three different addresses. However, the conclusion of the police investigations into these incidents was that there was no evidence to indicate that these crimes were directed against the victim in his capacity as a diplomat.

Moreover, a number of minor violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives in Sweden were reported during this period. These incidents included trespass on embassy premises, low-level threats, petty thefts and burglaries, in particular of rear-view mirrors belonging to official embassy or diplomatic vehicles, and some cases of harassment of visitors to missions. There were also a couple of cases involving various kinds of graffiti on Embassy premises and some minor damage to Embassy property.

23. The **Czech Republic** (15 May 2008) reported incidents involving the premises of the official residence of the South African Ambassador (11 May 2007) and the Consular Section of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (4 August 2007) in Prague:

There are no major incidents registered in the Czech Republic. Only two marginal incidents took place on the territory of the Czech Republic.

On Friday, 11 May 2007 at approximately 08:55 hours an individual entered the premises of the official residence of the South African Ambassador in Prague. During this unlawful entry, the Ambassador's handbag was stolen. Items stolen from the handbag included money as well as a mobile phone.

Regarding the security measures, the Protection Service of the Police of the Czech Republic increased the number of police patrols in the vicinity of the premises of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of South Africa. Furthermore, the competent District Office of the Municipal Police of the Capital of Prague was instructed to pay increased attention to the residence of the Ambassador. The Protection Service of the Police of the Czech Republic also recommended to the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa a few measures that should be adopted by the Embassy to increase its safety (reinforced fence, security locks, camera monitoring system ...).

On Saturday, 4 August 2007 in the afternoon, an individual entered the premises of the Consular Section of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in Prague. During this unlawful entry nothing was stolen.

Regarding the security measures, the Protection Service of the Police of the Czech Republic increased the number of police patrols in the vicinity of the premises of the diplomatic mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Furthermore, the competent District Office of the Municipal Police of the Capital of Prague was instructed to pay increased attention to the premises of the Embassy.

24. **Finland** (15 May 2008) reported incidents involving: the premises of the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania (17 August 2006); two diplomats of the Embassy of the United States of America (17 October 2006); an official vehicle of the Embassy of the Republic of Tunisia (28 March 2007); the Embassy of the

Republic of Estonia (27, 28 and 29 April 2007); the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco (6 June 2007); the premises of the Embassy of Romania (29 October 2007); the chaplain of the parish of St. Nicholas in Helsinki (Finland), who has diplomatic status in the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2007); and the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran (15 November 2007):

On 17 August 2006 an unknown person tried to break into the premises of the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania but was not able to break the doors. Minor damage was caused to the doors. The person remained unidentified.

On 17 October 2006 two diplomats of the Embassy of the United States of America were attacked by two unknown men while they were walking in a public park. The men were subsequently seized and sentenced for assault by the Helsinki District Court, one to conditional imprisonment and the other to pay fines.

On 28 March 2007 an official vehicle of the Embassy of the Republic of Tunisia was damaged in front of the Embassy. The offender remained unknown.

On 27 April 2007 a male person attached a piece of cloth resembling the flag of the Republic of Estonia to the gate of the Embassy. The cloth was covered with a swastika. The person was caught by the staff members of the Embassy and was handed over to the police. The person did not enter the premises of the Embassy and according to the police there are no grounds to suspect a crime. On 28 and 29 April 2007 eggs were thrown at the walls of the Embassy building. On the basis of anonymous information, the police interrogated a male person who denied his participation in the incident. According to the police there is not enough evidence against the person to proceed with a charge against him.

On 6 June 2007 the flag and the flagpole which were situated on the wall of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco were burnt. The offender remained unknown. The premises of the Embassy were not entered in connection with this incident.

On 29 October 2007 an unknown male person broke into the premises of the Embassy of Romania and stole a jacket from the Embassy's garage. An investigation was carried out by the police but the person remained unidentified.

The services of the parish of St. Nicholas in Helsinki were continuously disrupted by a male person during a longer period of time in 2007. There was growing concern about the safety of the chaplain of the parish, who has diplomatic status in the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The police investigated the incidents and the offender has been summonsed to appear in the Helsinki District Court for breach of sanctity of religion.

On 15 November 2007 an Iranian national threatened to attack the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The police were able to prevent

the attack and no injury was caused to the Ambassador. The person has left Finland and thus, the police investigation of the incident has been interrupted.

The Finnish authorities wish to assure the Secretary-General that they take very seriously their duty to take all appropriate action to protect the premises of diplomatic missions against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any attack on the person of the staff members of the missions.

25. **Turkey** (15 May 2008) referred to the incidents involving two cars belonging to the personnel of the Turkish Embassy and Consulate General (10 December 2007) and the Embassy building in Athens, Greece; the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia (21 February 2008); the Turkish Embassy in Vienna, Austria (17 March 2008); the Turkish Consulate in Bregenz, Austria (2 January 2008), as well as to the absence of measures by the local authorities for the protection of the chancelleries of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna:

1. On 10 December 2007 two cars belonging to the personnel of the Turkish Embassy and Consulate General in Athens were set on fire simultaneously. Despite the reports of the local police authorities describing the incidents as terror acts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece has qualified the incidents merely as "ordinary crime". The request of the Turkish authorities for compensation of the damages caused by the said incidents has yet to be responded to by the Greek authorities. Furthermore, in spite of the requests of the Turkish Embassy that demonstrators be kept at a distance from the Embassy, Greek police in some cases want to negotiate with the officials of the Turkish Embassy so that the demonstrators can approach the entrance of the Embassy building in order to post their declarations on the door.

2. On 21 February 2008, in the course of the demonstrations encouraged by certain officials, against the declaration of independence of Kosovo, stones and bricks were thrown at the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade and the Embassy building was extensively damaged. During the protests, unfortunately, the Turkish flag was also pulled down and burned. However, officials from the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have expressed regret over the incident. They have also said that all necessary measures aimed at ensuring the safety and security of the Embassies in Belgrade will be taken and damages to the Embassy building will be compensated.

3. On 17 March 2008 plastic bags filled with permanent paint were thrown by two persons at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna. The recordings of the security cameras revealed that the Austrian police, working on a 24-hour basis for the protection of the Turkish Embassy, failed to make the necessary intervention. The perpetrators of the above-mentioned incident, as well as those responsible for the Molotov cocktail attack of 2 January 2008 targeting the Turkish Consulate in Bregenz have not been apprehended to date. It should be noted that following these attacks the security level of the Turkish missions in Austria was temporarily raised, but soon after lowered to its previous level. It should further be noted that no measures by the local authorities were taken for the protection of the chancelleries of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna.

Since the last report, no serious violation has occurred of the protection and security provided to the diplomatic and consular missions and their representatives in Turkey. This is due to the prompt and effective analysis of the reports of threat and swift adoption of all preventive measures.

26. **Tunisia**, **Austria**, **Senegal**, **Bangladesh** and **Turkey** reported that there had been no violations on their respective territories during the reporting period.

III. Views expressed by States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 61/31

27. **Mexico** (5 June 2007) expressed the following views:

Diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations need to be protected against well-organized individual criminals or criminal groups, which may be extremely difficult to detect and identify. Unfortunately, as we have already seen, these individuals and/or groups may spend weeks or months preparing sophisticated and violent attacks, which are carried out in such a way as to increase the loss of human life and the damage to property.

Articles 22, 29 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and articles 31 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provide that the receiving State shall be responsible for protecting the premises of the diplomatic and consular missions within its territory as well as the person of the diplomatic and consular agents. Similarly, articles 1, 2 and 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, provide that States parties shall cooperate in the prevention of crimes against, among others, agents of intergovernmental organizations and their official premises.

Mexico is therefore of the view that States should conduct regular exercises to identify the vulnerabilities of the agents and premises in question. After identifying the risks and priorities, States should then conduct exercises to assess whether their current security practices and procedures effectively include all practicable measures for the protection of diplomatic and consular agents and premises, thereby effectively ensuring their security, in fulfilment of the international obligations of States.

A mechanism should also be established whereby States could actively exchange information about the measures they had taken and about their practices and experiences (such as legislative reforms, elaboration of emergency plans, establishment of specialized police units, training programmes for security officers, and installation of security and communications systems).

Lastly, Mexico is ready to support any initiative to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with international law, international practice and the national law of States.

28. **Saudi Arabia** (7 August 2007) referred to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 61/31:

> In view of the role of the United Nations and its diplomatic relations with Member States, paragraph 10 is an infringement on the national sovereignty of States and a direct interference in the process of formulating its political and security decisions since each State has the right to exercise its sovereignty over its territories as it sees fit to maintain its security. The competent authority believes that it is appropriate to reformulate the article in a manner that does not obligate it and let the State decide for itself.

29. **Finland** (15 May 2008) emphasized the importance of cooperation on security matters not only at the international level, but also at the national level between the missions and the competent local authorities.

30. **The Republic of Korea** (11 October 2006), **Pakistan** (17 January 2007), Lebanon (30 March 2007), **Mexico** (5 June 2007), **Cambodia** (6 June 2007), **Saudi Arabia** (7 August 2007), **Tunisia** (8 May 2008), **Bangladesh** (13 May 2008), **Senegal** (13 May 2008) and the **Czech Republic** (15 May 2008) also reported on the measures taken by them to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations on their respective territories.[8]

IV. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 20 June 2008

31. Each instrument listed below is represented in tables 1 and 2 by the letter shown on the left in the list.

A. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51);

B. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI);

C. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964);

D. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77);

[8] For the relevant parts of the reports see the website of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (www.un.org/ga/sixth/): sixty-third session; "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives"; report of the Secretary-General; full texts of the replies.

E. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

F. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

G. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977).

Table 1
Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Signature, succession to signature						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
60	18	29	48	19	38	25

Ratification, accession or succession						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
186	52	66	172	40	48	168

Table 2
Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Afghanistan								A						G
Albania	A							A			D			G
Algeria								A			D			G
Andorra								A			D			G
Angola								A			D			
Antigua and Barbuda											D			G
Argentina	A	B		D		F		A	B		D			G
Armenia								A			D			G
Australia	A			D			G	A		C	D		F	G
Austria	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Azerbaijan								A			D			G
Bahamas								A		C	D			G
Bahrain								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Bangladesh								A			D			G
Barbados								A			D			G
Belarus	A						G	A			D			G
Belgium	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Belize								A			D			G
Benin				D		F		A			D			G
Bhutan								A			D			G
Bolivia				D				A			D			G
Bosnia and Herzegovina					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Botswana								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Brazil	A			D	E			A			D			G
Bulgaria	A						G	A		C	D	E	F	G
Burkina Faso				D		F		A			D		F	G
Burundi								A						G
Cambodia								A	B	C	D			G
Cameroon				D	E	F		A			D			G
Canada	A						G	A			D			G
Cape Verde								A			D			G
Central African Republic	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C				G
Chad								A						
Chile	A			D		F		A			D			G
China								A			D			G
Colombia	A		C	D	E	F		A			D			G
Comoros								A						G
Congo				D	E	F		A						
Cook Islands														
Costa Rica	A			D				A		C	D			G
Côte d'Ivoire				D		F		A						G
Croatia								A			D			G
Cuba	A			D				A			D			G
Cyprus								A			D			G
Czech Republic								A			D			G
Democratic People's Republic of Korea								A			D			G
Democratic Republic of the Congo	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Denmark	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Djibouti								A			D			G
Dominica								A		C	D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Dominican Republic	A	B	C	D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ecuador	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Egypt								A	B		D	E		G
El Salvador								A			D			G
Equatorial Guinea								A			D			G
Eritrea								A			D			
Estonia								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ethiopia								A						G
Fiji								A		C	D			G
Finland	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
France	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Gabon				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Gambia														
Georgia								A			D			G
Germany	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ghana	A	B	C	D	E	F		A			D	E		G
Greece	A							A			D			G
Grenada								A			D			G
Guatemala	A						G	A			D			G
Guinea								A	B	C	D			G
Guinea-Bissau								A						
Guyana								A			D			G
Haiti								A			D			G
Holy See	A			D				A			D			
Honduras								A			D			G
Hungary	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Iceland							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
India								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Indonesia								A	B		D	E		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	A	B	C	D				A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Iraq	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E		G
Ireland	A		C	D		F		A			D			G
Israel	A		C	D				A						G
Italy	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Jamaica								A			D			G
Japan	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Jordan								A			D			G
Kazakhstan								A			D			G
Kenya								A	B	C	D	E	F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Kiribati								A			D			G
Kuwait				D	E	F		A		C	D			G
Kyrgyzstan								A			D			G
Lao People's Democratic Republic								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Latvia								A			D			G
Lebanon	A	B	C	D		F		A			D			G
Lesotho								A			D			
Liberia	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya								A	B		D			G
Liechtenstein	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Lithuania								A			D			G
Luxembourg	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Madagascar								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malawi								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malaysia								A	B	C	D			G
Maldives								A			D			G
Mali								A			D			G
Malta								A		C	D			G
Marshall Islands								A			D			G
Mauritania								A			D			G
Mauritius								A		C	D		F	G
Mexico	A			D				A			D		F	G
Micronesia (Federated States of)								A			D			G
Monaco								A			D			G
Mongolia							G	A			D			G
Montenegro						E	F	A	B	C	D			G
Morocco								A	B		D	E		G
Mozambique								A			D			G
Myanmar								A	B		D			G
Namibia								A			D			
Nauru								A						G
Nepal								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Netherlands								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
New Zealand	A		C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nicaragua							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niger				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nigeria	A							A			D			

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niue														
Norway	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Oman								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Pakistan	A							A		C	D		F	G
Palau														G
Panama	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Papua New Guinea								A			D			G
Paraguay							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Peru				D		F		A			D		F	G
Philippines	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Poland	A			D			G	A			D			G
Portugal								A			D			G
Qatar								A			D			G
Republic of Korea	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Republic of Moldova								A			D			G
Romania	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Russian Federation	A						G	A			D			G
Rwanda							G	A			D			G
Saint Kitts and Nevis														
Saint Lucia								A			D			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								A			D			G
Samoa								A			D			
San Marino	A							A						
Sao Tome and Principe								A			D			G
Saudi Arabia								A			D			G
Senegal	A	B						A			D	E	F	G
Serbia					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Seychelles								A		C	D		F	G
Sierra Leone								A						G
Singapore								A			D			G
Slovakia								A		C	D		F	G
Slovenia								A		C	D			G
Solomon Islands														
Somalia								A			D			
South Africa	A							A			D			G
Spain								A			D			G
Sri Lanka	A							A	B	C	D			G
Sudan								A			D			G

State	*Signature, succession to signature*							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Suriname								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Swaziland								A						G
Sweden	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Switzerland	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Syrian Arab Republic								A	B		D	E		G
Tajikistan								A			D			G
Thailand	A	B						A	B		D	E		G
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia								A	B	C	D			G
Timor-Leste								A			D			
Togo								A			D			G
Tonga								A			D			G
Trinidad and Tobago								A			D			G
Tunisia							G	A	B		D	E		G
Turkey								A			D			G
Turkmenistan								A			D			G
Tuvalu								A			D			
Uganda								A						G
Ukraine	A						G	A			D			G
United Arab Emirates								A			D			G
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
United Republic of Tanzania	A	B	C					A	B	C	D			
United States of America	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Uruguay	A			D		F		A			D			G
Uzbekistan								A			D			G
Vanuatu											D			
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	A			D				A			D			G
Viet Nam								A			D			G
Yemen								A			D			G
Zambia								A						
Zimbabwe								A			D			

United Nations A/63/122

General Assembly

Distr.: General
14 July 2008

Original: English

Sixty-third session
Item 91 (h) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains an account of new developments and the assistance accorded to Mongolia by the Secretariat and relevant United Nations bodies since the issuance of the previous report on this subject (A/61/164). During the reporting period, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, through its Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, held a series of consultations with Mongolia and relevant United Nations bodies on ways and means to consolidate Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status. Mongolia has continued to seek international recognition for and the institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status and is aiming to conclude a legal instrument on that status with its two immediate neighbours, China and the Russian Federation, with a separate draft protocol to be signed by the other nuclear-weapon States. Mongolia presented a draft trilateral treaty on its nuclear-weapon-free status to China and the Russian Federation in September 2007.

During the reporting period, the International Atomic Energy Agency carried out on-site verification activities in Mongolia in accordance with its safeguards agreement and additional protocol. In this context, the Agency was able to conclude that, for 2007, declared nuclear material in Mongolia remained in peaceful activities.

The findings and recommendations of the report on the economic and ecological vulnerabilities of Mongolia, issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Environment Programme, have been incorporated into the common country

* A/63/50.

08-42151 (E) 250708

assessment for the period from 2007 to 2011 and all five United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2007-2011) outcomes and related outputs. UNDP is providing support to follow up on the recommendations of the report by focusing on strengthening the economic security and preserving the ecological balance of Mongolia. Furthermore, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs has provided input for the economic and social advancement of Mongolia, primarily through undertaking operational developmental activities and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has been engaged in assisting Mongolia in building its technical and human capacity for disaster management.

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I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 61/87, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", the General Assembly invited Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its independent foreign policy, its economic security and its ecological balance, as well as its nuclear-weapon-free status. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in implementing the aforementioned necessary measures. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its sixty-third session on the implementation of the resolution. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

II. Activities related to Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status

2. Since the submission of the previous report of the Secretary-General on this subject (A/61/164), the Office for Disarmament Affairs, through its Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, has continued to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen its nuclear-weapon-free status. The Branch organized two meetings, on 30 January and 28 May 2008, of a consultative group of United Nations departments, programmes, funds and agencies to exchange information on activities aimed at implementing resolution 61/87 and to discuss the preparation of the 2008 report of the Secretary-General on the subject. Officials from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, and representatives of Mongolia attended the meetings.

3. Mongolia has continued to vigorously seek international recognition for and the institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status by working to conclude a legal instrument on its status with its two immediate neighbours, China and the Russian Federation, with a separate protocol to be signed by the other nuclear-weapon States, and by working to establish recognition of its status as a norm.

4. Following an initial contact in 2002, Mongolia presented a draft trilateral treaty on its nuclear-weapon-free status to China and the Russian Federation in September 2007. The draft was based on the elements of a treaty that Mongolia had presented to China and the Russian Federation at the initial contact meeting and included comments provided by those countries. The draft, in principle, reflects basic provisions usually embodied in international treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, taking into consideration the specific circumstances of Mongolia (i.e., the fact that it shares borders with two nuclear-weapon States). The draft clearly spells out the obligations of Mongolia, as well as commitments by its two neighbours. It also addresses cooperation in strengthening its nuclear-weapon-free status, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the physical protection of nuclear material, notification of nuclear-related activities and early warning in case of a nuclear accident. As in the case of traditional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the draft deals with control and verification issues without necessarily setting up a standing

mechanism. A draft protocol intended for signature by the other three nuclear-weapon States, to respect the treaty and contribute to its full implementation, is also proposed.

5. Numerous references at the bilateral and multilateral levels attest to international recognition and consolidation of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia as a norm. Documents containing references supporting Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status include the following:

(a) Final document of the fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana from 11 to 16 September 2006 ("The Heads of State or Government believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.");

(b) The Moscow declaration of 8 December 2006 ("The Russian Federation reaffirms its commitment to the joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States on security assurances in connection with Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, and considers that, in addition to contributing to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, this status is an important confidence-building measure in North-East Asia and beyond.");

(c) Joint communiqué of Mongolia and the Russian Federation of 13 April 2008, issued at the conclusion of the official visit of the Prime Minister of Mongolia, S. Bayar, to the Russian Federation from 10 to 13 April 2008 ("The Russian Federation, being a member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, reaffirms the efforts of Mongolia to strengthen its non-nuclear status and the security guarantee granted to Mongolia according to United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, as reflected in the joint statement of the nuclear Powers, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, dated 5 October 2000.").

6. In response to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), Mongolia continuing to enhance its border controls to better detect illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials. Mongolia covers a vast territory and shares long borders with its two neighbours. Its unique geographic characteristics and small population base present a serious border management challenge at a time of increased concern over transnational crimes, including trafficking in nuclear-related items. In response to the appeal of Mongolia to the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in 2007 the Government of the United States of America offered to fund a project to strengthen the technical capabilities of Mongolia in connection with export and import controls over nuclear and other radioactive materials. The project is aimed at improving technical systems for the detection and identification of nuclear and other radioactive materials at points of entry/exit in Mongolia. Consequently, a Government-to-Government memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials was signed on 23 October 2007, during the visit by the President of Mongolia to the United States of America. Under the memorandum of understanding, the United States of America would provide technical assistance in the form of equipment and materials, as well as training and services, for use at

points of entry/exit in Mongolia for the purpose of detecting and interdicting illicit trafficking on special nuclear material and other radioactive material.

7. Mongolia is also continuing to promote awareness regarding its security and nuclear-weapon-free status. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia organized a round-table discussion on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and related issues on 28 March 2008. Mongolia submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.1) to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2008. Moreover, Mongolia submitted a document entitled "Memorandum of the Government of Mongolia on promoting the country's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status"(A/63/73-S/2008/297) for circulation as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. In 2008, the focal point for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status initiated the establishment of official contacts with the relevant agencies and authorities responsible for the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The focal point has so far received positive responses from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the secretariat of the African Union.

8. During the reporting period, IAEA carried out on-site verification activities at the Isotope Centre waste storage facility in Ulaanbaatar and the Nuclear Research Centre of the National University of Mongolia in accordance with the safeguards agreement and additional protocol. In this context, IAEA was able to conclude that, for 2007, declared nuclear material in Mongolia remained in peaceful activities. In addition, consultations were conducted with regard to the Agency's proposal to amend Mongolia's small quantities protocol, in line with the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors of September 2005.

9. In September 2007, IAEA organized and conducted a radiation safety infrastructure appraisal mission to assess the regulatory infrastructure of Mongolia for radiation safety. At the end of the mission, the appraisal team made two recommendations to the Government of Mongolia: (a) to strengthen the role of the nuclear regulatory authority so that it could develop regulations and establish direct reporting arrangements with the responsible Minister or the Prime Minister; and (b) to initiate, as a matter priority, measures to design and construct a safe and secure radioactive waste storage facility, in particular for the irradiation sources from the Isotope Centre and the Institute of Physics. As a follow-up to those recommendations, the Government of Mongolia has taken a number of steps to strengthen the nuclear regulatory authority and increase the safety of storage of irradiation sources.

10. The issue of the utilization of the vast uranium resources of Mongolia and the introduction of nuclear power encompasses both nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of the international security of the country. The dependence of Mongolia on petroleum imports, insufficient domestic energy supplies and the urgent need to address urban air pollution are some of the factors that led the Government to formulate a draft national concept paper for the utilization of uranium and nuclear power. The implementation of a step-by-step policy on the use of nuclear energy and the construction of a nuclear power plant is also viewed in the context of the Millennium Development Goals and based on the comprehensive national

development strategy of Mongolia, which was adopted by the State Great Khural (parliament) on 31 January 2008.

11. Mongolia is seeking to become a developer, a processor and an exporter of uranium. It is also interested in introducing nuclear power for energy, including for heating purposes, as a cleaner alternative to coal plants. The use of nuclear power is considered to be an important lever in ensuring the sustainable development and national energy security of Mongolia and improving the living standards of its people. A number of nuclear-capable States, listed in annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, have expressed interest, and readiness to cooperate, in uranium prospecting, exploration and refining on Mongolian territory and in the building of small or medium-sized nuclear power stations.

12. Mongolia believes that all of its activities relating to uranium utilization and the introduction of nuclear power must fully comply with IAEA safeguards and other internationally accepted standards, rules and regulations. Mongolia has therefore submitted its draft national concept paper to IAEA, seeking the Agency's technical and legal assistance. The Agency has offered to dispatch two expert teams to conduct studies on the country's prospects for uranium utilization and the introduction of nuclear power as the initial stage of IAEA assistance in those newly emerging areas of cooperation.

III. Non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia's international security

13. The findings and recommendations of the report on the economic and ecological vulnerabilities of Mongolia, carried out with support from UNDP and in collaboration with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Environment Programme, have been incorporated in the common country assessment for the period from 2007 to 2011 and all five United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2007-2011) outcomes and related outputs.

14. UNDP is currently providing support to Mongolia by focusing on strengthening the economic security and preserving the ecological balance of the country. This includes projects focusing on the Millennium Development Goals, trade, disaster management and environmental governance:

(a) In the context of the Millennium Development Goal-based national development strategy, approved in 2008 by the Mongolian parliament, UNDP Mongolia is supporting the Government in the formulation of a financing strategy which will help target the budget to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and other poverty reduction goals, while at the same time helping to align foreign aid to the Millennium Development Goals;

(b) Under its ongoing trade and human development project for inclusive growth, UNDP is supporting the Ministry of Trade in formulating a human-development-focused medium-term trade/export strategy;

(c) UNDP has, since 2002, provided support for disaster management through its Mongolian disaster management project. The document relating to the third phase of that project was signed in April 2008. The third phase will strengthen disaster preparedness and mitigation through support for capacity-building at all levels, including at the community level, and help mitigate and manage disasters, including man-made disasters such as chemical spills;

(d) Under the ongoing environmental governance project, UNDP Mongolia is supporting a technical assessment of the capacity of existing institutions and laws to address environmental issues, with the aim of identifying overlaps, gaps and contradictions in laws and institutional functions. The project is aimed at strengthening capacities for intersectoral environment planning, monitoring and coordination at all levels and supporting timely reporting and follow-up of United Nations conventions.

15. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs has provided input for the economic and social advancement of Mongolia, primarily through undertaking operational developmental activities. These include a number of international technical cooperation workshops, organized by the Department, with the participation of officials and experts from Mongolia and other countries, to discuss social development and public investment policies.

16. In February 2008, at a meeting with the Permanent Representative of Mongolia in New York, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs contributed concrete suggestions on mining development policy in Mongolia, including the organization of study tours for Government officials to a select number of countries with extensive experience in rapid mining growth, its impact and opportunities; technical advisory services on needs and aspirations; in-country workshops to explore issues and policies; as well as measures aimed at building the capacity of the public sector to deal with foreign investors.

17. There has been significant support from the United Nations in the area of disaster management, which has led to the establishment of a non-military National Disaster Management Agency. Since the 2004 and 2005 preparedness assessment missions of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has kept in regular contact with the Government of Mongolia on preparedness-related activities, including preparedness for natural disasters and an avian flu pandemic, as well as the promotion of civil-military cooperation.

IV. Conclusion

18. It has been 10 years since the General Assembly unanimously adopted the first resolution on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status (resolution 53/77 D), in 1998. On the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of its nuclear-weapon-free status in 2007, the President of Mongolia, Nambar Enkhbayar, sent a letter to the Secretary-General expressing his deep gratitude for the firm support of the organization for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. As described in the present report, Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status is being consolidated and institutionalized and gaining wider recognition. The Government of Mongolia informed the Office for Disarmament Affairs that it presented a draft trilateral treaty on its nuclear-weapon-free status to China and the Russian Federation in September 2007 as a follow-up to its initial contact with the two countries in 2002. Furthermore, various departments, programmes, funds and agencies of the United Nations have continued to assist Mongolia in coping with its

economic and ecological vulnerabilities. The Secretary-General hopes that the assistance provided by the United Nations will further contribute to consolidating Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and to achieving sustainable development and balanced growth, as well as reinforcing its efforts in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.